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1. Introduction 
Common property resources have long been in the center of public interest regarding the 
mechanisms used by communities that share them (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1994 and many citations 
used there).  The framework suggested in Ostrom et al. (1994) is one of interaction among the 
users of the resource, assuming a common interest and thus, an arrangement that will be 
acceptable to all.  Two main approaches can be identified, that help in analytically understanding 
the outcome of an allocation problem of such character—negotiation approaches (NA) and 
cooperative game theory (CGT).  Although the two approaches depart from different directions 
and are based on different assumptions, they complement each other based on the principle that 
was suggested by Carraro et al (2005b:39) “The perception of fairness plays a crucial role in 
determining how a surplus is divided, and the potential allocation rules must be perceived as 
‘equitable’ and ‘envy-free’ by all parties”. 
  NA focus on the resolution of conflicts originating from stakeholders’ different perceptions 
and uses of natural resources. Recent literature on environmental management and catchment 
management in particular, place strong emphasis on achieving negotiated settlements to such 
conflicts (Becu et al., 2003).  In the water sector, there have been many applications of both NA 
and CGT at various levels, starting from sectoral through international (Carraro et al., 2005a; 
Parrachino et al., 2006).  So far, the literature has applied separately NA and CGT to solving 
allocation issues and has not attempted at comparing the NA and CGT solutions.  Other authors 
argue that participation in knowledge-sharing for water is a fundamental requisite because of the 
cumulative effects of individual actions on the patterns of water use at the irrigation system and 
river basin scale (Lankford and Watson, 2006).  Although it is expected that under certain 
conditions of interaction among the parties, NA and the CGT will lead to similar allocation 
solutions, it is still not clear if empirically this is the case.   3
  In this paper we apply a negotiation procedure and a CGT approach to a water allocation 
problem in the Kat watershed in South Africa. We use simplifying assumptions to allow a 
comparable solution.  We apply a Role-Playing Game that is a component of the Companion 
Modeling approach (Barreteau et al. 2004), which has already demonstrated its capacity for 
promoting discussion among stakeholders with contrasted and eventually conflicting viewpoints 
(Dray et al. 2006).  We formulate the same allocation problem also as a CGT, evaluating 
allocations (Shapley value and the nucleolus), which in our case are contained in the core, thus 
showing a relevant stability property. We compare the allocation solutions and explain sources 
for differences.  The next section provides a short description of the geographical, historical, 
political and institutional aspects of the Kat watershed.  Then, the water allocation issues in the 
watershed are discussed.  The fourth section formulates the water allocation problem as a 
negotiation game and the fifth section presents the negotiated solution to the allocation problem, 
Section 6 compares and explains differences, and section 7 provides possible extensions.  The 
paper is then concluded. 
2. The Kat watershed in South Africa
5 
The Kat River valley (Figure 1), a tributary of the Great Fish River, is situated in the Eastern 
Cape province of South Africa.  Although the watershed has a relatively high rainfall, much of 
the climate of the 1,700 km
2 catchment is sub-humid to semi-arid.  The fertile valley land can be 
utilized only through irrigation, using water from the Kat River. Prior to 1969, irrigators relied 
on the natural flow in the river, but since 1969 water from the Kat Dam (a 24 million cubic 
meters (Mm
3) storage capacity) became available. While irrigation takes up by far the majority 
of water in the catchment, domestic water users (about 49,500 inhabitants in 2001) represent an 
important component in the demand for water in the catchment.  
  Four groups of irrigators can be identified in the Kat Valley: small scale black farmers, 
often forming cooperatives, large scale ‘emerging’ black farmers
6, white commercial farmers 
with scheduled water rights, white commercial farmers without scheduled water rights. The main 
water related stakeholders in the Kat Valley are therefore (1) the four groups of irrigators, (2) 
domestic water users and (3) the Municipality of Nkonkombe.  The South Africa Department of 
                                                 
5 Modified from Farolfi and Rowntree (2005). 
6 “Emerging” citrus farmers are black farmers that after 1994 had the right to exploit (and not own) citrus farms located during Apartheid period 
in the Ciskei Bantustan and previously owned and managed by the public Bantustan’s administration.    4
Water Affairs (DWAF), currently operating the Kat Dam, is considered the 4th important 
stakeholder in the system. The complex and contentious political history of the valley has given 
rise to a power dynamic that historically has favored the white commercial farmers producing 
citrus at the expense of the black population. These white farmers controlled water use through 
the Kat River Irrigation Board (IB).
7   
 
Figure 1: Map of the Kat Catchment and the stylized sub-catchments in the RPG (for the 
conversion factors used see Table 1) 
 
 
3. Water allocation issues in the Kat watershed 
Water sources in the Kat River valley are currently almost exclusively from surface water. Some 
groundwater developments are foreseen in the near future and this could increase water 
availability in the catchment by nearly 10 percent (DWAF, 2001).  As mentioned above, 
decisions about water allocation strategies are taken by the recently established Water User 
Association (WUA), which represents the various groups of stakeholders in the catchment.  
                                                 
7 The IB was substituted lately by a more participatory Water User Association (WUA) including representatives of all main groups of 
stakeholders in the Kat. This organization is now in charge of defining the water “business plan” indicating water allocation strategies and 
resource management for the catchment.  While the difference between the IB and WUA may not be essential for the CGT, it is very important 
for the negotiation process, as will be discussed later. 
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  Irrigated agriculture is the largest water user in the catchment, accounting for 60% of the 
water requirements, including the ecological reserve
8 (12%).  Domestic uses (13%), afforestation 
(10%) and losses due to alien vegetation (5%) are the other requirements in the catchment. The 
recent history of South Africa led to the co-existence of different groups of irrigators in the 
catchment. These farmers are located in specific portions of the catchment
9 (Figure 1), namely 
smallholders and emerging farmers in the Upper Sub catchment (U), emerging and large-scale 
farmers in the Middle Sub catchment (M) and large-scale farmers in the Lower Sub catchment 
(L) (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2005).  
  Domestic water consumption per capita is low by existing standards, mainly due to striking 
rural poverty and non-existence of services (Farolfi and Abrams, 2005).  A crucial issue for the 
National Water Resource Strategy of South Africa is the protection of environmental and 
ecological needs, which is translated into the definition and the respect of the ecological reserve 
in each catchment. 
  The Kat River Dam is certainly the main tool for water supply management in the 
catchment. The dam is currently operated by DWAF based on a mechanism of water licenses and 
scheduled-non scheduled users. It is expected that soon the WUA will be responsible for the 
management of the dam.  Therefore, in this paper we assume that it is the WUA and not DWAF 
that decides on Dam water allocation.  Future demands were identified (Farolfi-Abrams, 2005) to 
include increase in citrus surface; increase in small-scale irrigation schemes; increase in domestic 
uses, particularly in rural areas; more tourism, game farms and, possibly, golf courses.  These 
will be addressed in future analyses.  
4. Formulating water allocation decision as a negotiation process 
To facilitate discussions about water allocation strategies within the Kat River WUA, 
stakeholders’ representatives accepted to take part in a process of Companion Modeling 
(Barreteau et al., 2003) consisting of an iterative and participatory development of a simulation 
model—KAT AWARE (Farolfi and Bonté, 2005) that illustrates alternative scenarios of water 
allocation in the catchment (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2005).  
                                                 
8 Defined in the National Water Act as “the portion of the resource kept unavailable for allocation and dedicated to basic ecological purposes”. 
9 These portions of the catchment correspond to the three voting areas identified to nominate the Kat River Valley Water Users Association 
representatives (Figure 1).   6
  An important component of Companion Modeling is the use of Role-Playing Games (RPG) 
to facilitate stakeholders’ comprehension of the developing model and to allow modelers better 
understanding of stakeholders’ strategies and behavior.  For this purpose, a RPG was constructed 
based on the model KAT AWARE, which is being developed with the WUA following the 
Companion Modeling approach.  
  In the RPG, the Kat catchment (Figure 1) is divided into three sub-catchments 
corresponding to the three mentioned voting areas: Upper, Middle and Lower. Two smallholding 
irrigation schemes (20 ha each) are located in the Upper Sub-catchment (U), two citrus farmers 
(30 ha each) are located in the Middle Sub-catchment (M) and a citrus farmer (40 ha
10) is in the 
Lower Sub-catchment (L).  Farmers have irrigated land on which they produce Cabbages if they 
are smallholders or Citrus if they are large-scale farmers.  Domestic water users live in three 
villages
11: one in U (3 000 hab), one in M (5 000 hab) and one in L (15 000 hab).  An average 
amount of rainfall equivalent to 2 million m
3/year falls on U, whilst annual rainfall equivalent to 
1 million m
3/year falls on the M and on L.  A dam with a storage capacity of 4 million m
3 is 
located in U.  A Water Users Association (WUA) exists in the catchment and is responsible for 
water management and allocation according to the principles of Social Equity, Environmental 
Sustainability and Economic Efficiency as indicated in the Water Legislation of South Africa. 
All players are members of the WUA. 
  To simplify the game while reflecting its reality, data representing the actual catchment are 
transformed into values that are proportional to the real ones, and only 8 players are left to 
interact (table 1)
12.  The primary goal of the game is for the catchment as a whole to manage in a 
sustainable way the available water resource, taking into consideration the above-mentioned 
principles.  At the same time, the goal for each player is to maximize their individual economic 
gain and if they are a village manager to maximize also villagers’ satisfaction (see additional 
discussion in the CGT section), within the context of the group goal.  The game is set to allow 
sessions of 7 simulated years. This choice is a compromise between playability and a time span 
                                                 
10 Ha=hectare.  1 ha=2.5 acre. 
11 The figure for the inhabitants in the villages and for the dam storage are those used in the RPG and will be used also for the CGT approach. 
12 The conversion factors for the different variables range between 2.1 (Inhabitants in catchment) and 13 (Surface citrus). The arbitrary choice of 
the conversion factors was due to the trade-off between having an RPG that represents the reality and an RPG that is “playable”.  It may be 
noticed that players validated the RPG representation of the Kat during the first session. The only criticism was for the disproportionately high 
importance of domestic water consumption in the RPG compared to the real one. This issue was addressed in a second version of the RPG by 
changing the conversion factor of “Inhabitants in catchment” from 2.1 to 6.   7
sufficient to provide elements of discussion on mid-term consequences of water allocation. The 
presented RPG session spans over 6 years.  
 
Table 1: Actual and transformed values for use in the RPG of main variables in the Kat Basin 
Variable  Actual values  Values in the RPG 
Dam Capacity (Mm
3) 24,000,000  4,000,000 
Natural runoff (Mm
3) 13,500,000  3,300,000 
Domestic consumption (Mm
3) 1,500,000  580,000 
Irrigation consumption (Mm
3) 11,000,000  1,064,000 
Cabbage area (ha)  180  40 
Citrus area (ha)  1,300  100 
Inhabitants in catchment  49,000  23,000 
Annual outflow  1,600,000  550,000 
 
  At the beginning of the game farmers receive a number of hectares corresponding to their 
farm (or irrigation scheme) and for each ha a symbol corresponding to their production (cabbage 
or citrus).  Farmers also receive an amount of money corresponding to their previous year’s 
profit and a number of workers indicating how many permanent or seasonal employees they 
hired the previous season
13.  Every year farmers may decide to increase or reduce their irrigated 
surface. They can also decide to change their production (cabbage to citrus or vice versa). If they 
decide to plant new citrus, they can choose an innovative irrigation technology (drip), which 
would cost more but will save water.  Cabbage producers can decide to have 1 cycle, 2 cycles or 
3 cycles of cabbage production per year on their fields.  Budgets and water consumption data for 
Citrus and Cabbage are provided to farmers at the beginning of the game.  Village managers 
receive, and pay for, bulk water from the WUA that manages the entire water in the catchment 
and provide water services (including water distribution) to the households of each village.  They 
start with a given ratio of water sources for the households of their village. These water sources 
are: river water; collective tap; indwelling tap. Each water source has a different cost (investment 
+ operating cost) that has to be added to the cost of the bulk water the managers “buy” from the 
WUA.  Village managers can charge their habitants with a per capita tariff for the water services 
they provide, and this corresponds to their annual income.  The households derive a certain level 
                                                 
13 For production and profit functions used in the KarAWARE model that supports the RPG, see the characteristic functions used also for the 
CGT model.   8
of satisfaction (utility) from their income that can be spent on consumption goods. Because 
households have different levels of effort associated with the various water sources they are 
provided, they also obtain different levels of utility from each of the three sources of water.  
The village manager objective is twofold. They want to maximize their profit resulting 
from the difference between the tariff collection and the water provision cost + bulk water cost 
and at the same time they want to maximize the sum of households’ utility. Elements of budgets 
and utility values for households are provided to local village managers at the beginning of the 
game.  
A number of factors varying annually, such as rainfall, market prices and population 
dynamics can influence players’ strategies. 
4.1 Negotiation results  
This section illustrates some outcomes of a RPG session held in the Kat catchment in November 
2005. The set-up of the game and the players participating in the session are presented in the 
right-hand side rectangle of figure 1. The initial values characterizing each player are presented 
in the left column of table 2, which also includes final values (end of year 6 of the negotiation 
game) and averages for the economic values, providing an indication of the strategies and trends 
followed by players during the RPG session. In the tables that follow, year 1 is the initial state 
and was set by the game facilitators; years 2 to 6 were actually played. 
  Table 2 shows the initial and final values of the exogenous factors controlled by the game 
operators. Average values are also provided in the right column of table 1. The game facilitators 
introduced a general trend of increasing water scarcity. This stress was produced by a 
combination of lower rainfall and increasing population in the catchment. Some marginal 
changes (mainly reductions) affected crop prices. A relatively low level of uncertainty was 
introduced in the session, corresponding to a small difference between expected (forecasted) and 
actual exogenous factors to which stakeholders were confronted.  
Table 2 – Exogenous factors in the RPG session: initial, final and average values 
Variable Initial Final Difference    Average
  %
Rainfall Upper (m3) 2 ,000,000 1,400,000 -30 1,483,333
Rainfall Middle (m3) 1 ,000,000 600,000 -40 650,000
Rainfall Lower (m3) 1 ,000,000 600,000 -40 666,667  9
Population Upper (inhab.) 3 ,000 3,500 17 3,250
Population Middle  (inhab.) 5 ,000 5,500 10 5,250
Population Lower  (inhab.) 15,000 16,000 7 15,500
Market Price Citrus (R/ton) 2 ,000 2,000 0 1,950
Market Price Cabbage 6.00 5.00 -17  5.67
Note: R=Rand, the South African currency.  1 USD=6 Rand 
 
  Clear differences in behavior and strategies among players were observed for different 
sectors and in the three sub-catchments (table 3 and 4).  In the U the two irrigation schemes 
opted first for an intensification of their cabbage productions (from 2 to 3 cycles per year). Only 
at the end of the RPG session the second irrigation scheme decided to reduce the cultivated 
surface by 50%.  In the M, the two citrus farmers adopted two very different strategies, the one 
oriented first towards diversification (cabbage in addition to citrus) and then abandoning citrus, 
whilst the other one kept constant the citrus surface but also planted an equivalent surface at 
cabbage.  In L, the large citrus farm adopted a quite “conservative” strategy consisting in 
reducing only by 25% the planted surface at citrus and not moving to cabbage.  All new citrus 
plants in the three farms were equipped with innovative irrigation technologies, consisting in drip 
systems, more costly in terms of investment, but water saving.    
Table 3: Strategies and outcomes for the 5 farms during the RPG session: initial and final values 
  Initial Final Differenc Annual 
  %
Irrigation Scheme 1 (U)
Ha citrus old technology 0 0 0.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 0 0.0
Ha cabbage 20 20 0.0
Cycles cabbage 2 3 50.0
Total Ha  20 20 0.0
Employment (n) 51 76.6 50.1 84
Cumulated Profit (R) 64,208 250,000 289.4 43,640*
 
Irrigation Scheme 2 (U)
Ha citrus old technology 0 0 0.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 0 0.0
Ha cabbage 20 10 -50.0
Cycles cabbage 2 2 0.0
Total Ha  20 10 -50.0
Employment (n) 51 25 -51.0 53.2
Cumulated Profit (R) 64,208 250,000 289.4 42,406
   10
Citrus Farm 1 (M)
Ha citrus old technology 30 0 100.0
Ha citrus new technology 05
Ha cabbage 0 30
Cycles cabbage 0 1
Total Ha  30 35 16.7
Employment (n) 46 46 0.0 55.4
Cumulated Profit (R) 829,300 3,290,00 296.7 554,299
 
Citrus Farm 2 (M)
Ha citrus old technology 30 0 100.0
Ha citrus new technology 03 0
Ha cabbage 0 30
Cycles cabbage 0 1
Total Ha  30 60 100.0
Employment (n) 46 84 82.6 73.8
Cumulated Profit (R) 829,300 740,000 -10.8 126,052
 
Citrus Farm 3 (L)
Ha citrus old technology 40 0 100.0
Ha citrus new technology 03 0
Ha cabbage 0 0 0.0
Cycles cabbage 0 0 0.0
Total Ha  40 30 -25.0
Employment (n) 62 44 -29.0 71.2
Cumulated Profit (R) 1 ,105,700 2,710,00 145.1 455,562
* Annual profit is the net financial result of a specific year. It is not cumulated. 
 
  Table 4 shows the dynamics in the village managers’ decisions regarding water services 
and tariffs for their households.  As a general trend, better water provision was introduced in all 
villages, and this was accompanied by an increase in water tariffs required from the households. 
In some cases the increase in domestic water tariffs was perceived too high by local residents 
(village L), affecting negatively their utility. On the other hand, this water tariff increase in 
village L triggered a huge improvement in the village manager’s profit. 
 
Table 4: Strategies and outcomes for the three villages during the RPG session: initial and final 
values 
 Initial  Final Difference Annual  average 
  %  
Village 1 (U)  
Population (Inhab.) 3 ,000 3,500 16.7
Share of river source  0.8 0.0 -80.0  11
Share of collective tap 0.2 0.2 0.0
Share of indwelling tap 0.0 0.8 80.0
Water tariff (R/m3) 1 2 100.0 1.7
Satisfaction index  40.6 41.7 2.8 41.3
Manager's cum. Profit (R) 20,500 420,000 1,948.8 70,900*
 
Village 2 (M) 
Population (Inhab.) 5 ,000 5,500 10.0
Share of river source  0.8 0 -80.0
Share of collective tap 0.2 0.2 0.0
Share of indwelling tap 0 0.8 80.0
Water tariff (R/m3) 1 1.7 70.0 1.5
Satisfaction index  40.6 42.89 5.7 42.2
Manager's cum. Profit (R) 34,180 300,000 777.7 54,600
 
Village 3 (L) 
Population (Inhab.) 15,000 16,000 6.7
Share of river source  0.1 0 -10.0
Share of collective tap 0.4 0 -40.0
Share of indwelling tap 0.5 1 50.0
Water tariff (R/m3) 1.5 2 33.3 1.8
Satisfaction index  42.7 41.9 -1.8 42.4
Manager's cum. Profit (R) 128,130 2,110,000 1,546.8 351,400
 
* Annual profit is the net financial result of a specific year. It is not cumulated. 
 
  It was clear that the WUA gave priority to the domestic uses of water, not hampering any 
initiative of water provision enhancement by the local managers. The respect of an ecological 
reserve set at 500,000 m
3/year in years of drought and 750,000 in normal years was another 
WUA priority. Agricultural uses were more controlled and the release of new water licenses to 
farmers was less automatic, especially when the dam reserve became scarce (last three years of 
the RPG session). 
  The water allocation policy by the WUA allowed positive results in terms of economic 
outputs for four farms out of five (cumulated profit). Nevertheless, the average annual profit 
referred to the played period shows a lower performance with respect to the initial state for all 
farms, particularly those cultivated at citrus. Cabbage was more profitable due to a relatively 
steady trend in market price (excluding the final two years) and, more important, because no 
investment is required for new plantations. Farm 4 in the M subcatchment registered the worst 
performance paying the cost of heavy investment in new hectares planted at citrus combined 
with lower market prices in years 3 and 4. In addition, the session was too short to allow the   12
farmer recovering the investment through new citrus plants production (in the RPG, citrus takes 
2 years after plantation to become productive).   
  Job creation was generally positive for all farms (average higher than initial value). The 
water shortage provoked by the WUA decision to stop releasing water the last year had very 
negative impacts on job creation, particularly in the M and the L sub-catchments, where citrus is 
cultivated.   
  Table 5 shows also the dynamics of water consumption in the three sub catchments. At 
year 1 L is the most water consuming (large village and large citrus farm) followed by M and U. 
The latter increases consistently water consumption during years 2 to 4 due mainly to the 
intensification of cabbage production. The slight increase in water consumption in the remaining 
sub catchments is due to domestic better provision and demographic positive trends. At year 5, 
water consumption in U contracted due to a change of strategy in one of the two irrigation 
schemes. In year 6 the WUA decided to stop releasing water from the dam in order to allow 
refilling.   
  The increasing water demand in the three sub-catchments is partially compensated by water 
releases from the Dam decided by the WUA (table 5). During the first 4 years of the game the 
WUA opted for a use of the Dam water to satisfy users’ water demand and to provide a water 
flow in the river able to preserve ecological equilibriums (the ecological reserve).  
  At the end of year 5, when the Dam level reached 1.3 million cubic meters, the WUA 
decided to stop suddenly and completely water flushes. This decision determined an 
improvement of the dam water quantity, but had an immediate and dramatic consequence on the 
socio-economic and environmental indicators in the catchment.  
 
Table 5: Profit (R), job creation (n. of employees), water consumption (m
3) in the three sub 
catchments; Dam level and Ecological reserve (m
3) for the whole basin 
  YEAR 1 2345  6 AVERAGE
Profit U    148,924 191,235 258,121 328,450 142,437  -127,311 156,976
Profit M    1,692,874 1,089,725  332,920 1,047,169 1,196,990  -949,883  734,966 
Profit L    1,233,926 688,012 337,207  1,330,596  1,585,825  -333,844  806,954 
Profit catchment  3,075,724 1,968,972  928,248 2,706,215 2,925,252  - 1,698,895 
            13
Agric. profit U  128,416 168,774 184,898 228,657 40,474  -234,938 86,047
Agric. profit M  1,658,694  1,081,258 256,006 991,829  1,132,383  - 680,351 
Agric. profit L  1,105,796 525,873 143,245 833,148  1,031,818  -906,511  455,562 
          
Employment U  102.1 140.39 178.67 191.43 108.48 102.09  137.19 
Employment M  92.4 119.26 132.72 141.68 156.44 129.82  128.72 
Employment L  61.59 75.71 76.99 84.05 84.69 44.27  71.22 
          
Annual water cons. U  376,893 557,852 754,369 886,709 568,552 280,028  570,734 
Annual water cons. M  464,526 612,535 657,732 800,720 843,208 564,019  657,123 
Annual water cons. L  784,335 994,810 998,942  1,148,847  1,193,328 658,260  963,087 
          
Dam level    4,000,000 3,674,800 2,774,144 1,814,240 1,368,704 2,361,648  2,665,589 
          
Ecological reserve  1,700,000  1,500,000 750,000 850,000 950,000 350,000 1,016,667 
 
  Table 5 allows formulating some considerations on the general socio-economic and 
environmental trends by sub-catchment. Job creation is linked to the surfaces cropped and to the 
intensity of production (cycles of cabbages on the same surface); it therefore follows closely the 
dynamics of water consumption. As a general trend (average on the played period), job creation 
is positive in all catchments, particularly in sub-catchments U and in M. Profit is more sensitive 
to water availability and during the first years of game is (negatively) influenced by high 
investments in the citrus farms.
14 This is also why the performances of M and L are worst that 
the one of U (average annual profit). The annual figures show clearly the dramatic impact of the 
WUA decision at year 5 on profit generation for the three sub catchments. Again, M and L where 
citrus farms are located suffer particularly for the water shortage. 
  Finally, it is worthwhile noticing that the decision to stop completely water flushes from 
the dam had a negative impact also on the ecological reserve, well below the limit of 500,000 
cubic meters at year 6. As an average, the ecological reserve was kept at about 1 million m
3/year, 
corresponding to 40% less than its level at the beginning of the negotiation game session, but 
33% more than the limit set for wet years and 100% more than the limit set for dry years. 
                                                 
14 In this game, profit=total income-total costs. If a farmer invests in citrus plantations, therefore, his annual income during the first years of new 
orchards is constant (no production) whilst the costs increase. It was noticed by citrus farmers during the game debriefing that this is not really 
how they see things because an investment is calculated as a positive asset in their budget, whereas here is a negative (cost) one. They suggested 
calling “cash-flow” what we call “profit” in the game outcomes.   14
5. Formulating water allocation decision as a cooperative game 
The Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) model will introduce several assumptions.  We assume 
that the players are rational, price takers and profit maximizers.  They will engage in cooperative 
arrangements only if it can improve their situation compared with the status quo.   
The watershed includes three players (each with several water activities), Upper sub-
watershed, Middle sub-watershed, and Lower sub-watershed—U, M, L, as is described in the left 
rectangle of Figure 1 (we will use i=1 for U, i=2 for M, and i=3 for L).  There is a water storage 
(dam) in the U sub-watershed, and an outlet of the river beyond the L sub-watershed (we will 
refer from hereafter only to watershed).  There is a deterministic (at this point) rainfall quantity 
that falls on the area of each watershed and ends up in the river.  There are no losses of water and 
all the rainfall can be used as a source for the water-activities (this assumption can also be 
modified by having a fraction of the rainfall available for use, assuming losses and evaporation).  
So, each player refers to the amount of rainfall on its area as water in the river available for use.  
There are also ground water sources, but for simplicity, they are not included.  Players can also 
use water from the reservoir, that is released (flashed) by the WUA upon a request from the 
player (if supplies last).  The WUA can refuse supplying water from the reservoir if the amount 
in the reservoir is below a given level. 
The WUA is actually the authority that oversees and regulates the players’ behavior.  
From the point of view of CGT, the WUA could decide on an allocation of water that respects 
principles on which it has been agreed upon (e.g., Social Equity, Environmental Sustainability 
and Economic Efficiency).  It is assumed that the players obey the WUA rules of behavior.  The 
objective of each player is to maximize annual profits subject to water availability, prices and 
costs, and the WUA rules of behavior.   
Rules of behavior that are respected by the players include: (1) No player extracts water 
that runs in the river that doesn’t belong to that player.  Such water include the water that the 
WUA dedicates to run in the river to keep water flow in the river in the segments belonging to U, 
M, and L, (2) water that has to be released to the Fish River below the L watershed, (3) water 
that was released from the reservoir for use by a given player and has to run in the river through 
the ‘territory’ of another player.   15
Constraints for each player include (1) fixed Citrus land, (2) limited land for cabbage, (3) 
fixed number of inhabitants consuming water, (4) given amount of rainfall that can be utilized 
via the flow of the river. 
Constraints or rules for the WUA (or at the Kat watershed) include: (1) a given amount of 
water in the storage at the beginning of the year, (2) a given amount of water required in the 
storage at the end of the year, (3) a given amount to be released from the Kat to the Fish river, 
(4) a given amount to be left in the river for local benefits, (5) a minimum annual amount of 
water per inhabitant to fulfill human needs. (6) a given amount of available laborers to work in 
Citrus or cabbage operations.  It is assumed that these laborers can move freely between the three 
watersheds.  Additional assumptions represent the linkage between the water use and water flow 
in the river.  These linkages are expressed in the equations of the model in the Annex. 
The paper investigates the likelihood of cooperation among the three players.  CGT 
introduces the concept of the characteristic function for each set of coalitional arrangements 
among the players in the watershed.  A characteristic function is the best outcome of a coalition.  
Further assumptions are needed.  In our CGT analysis we shall consider a one year game period.  
The essential aspect of this choice is that we shall not consider investment decisions
15. This is a 
clear limitation, but we consider that in the NA players are not in the condition of making 
optimal investment decisions (especially due to the short time span allowed). Hence, the one year 
timespan that we use in the CGT approach should offer a more appropriate benchmark as far as 
comparison with the NA is sought for.  
Let us start with the status quo, individual coalitions.  The status quo is represented by 
each player (watershed) working on their own to maximize their utility/profits from the available 
water they have, subject to individual constraints of each player and rule constraints imposed by 
the WUA.  There are no special treatment of the water activities and the land constraints.   
However, in the maximization problem for each player in the case of the status quo, we need to 
add several assumptions to deal with the watershed constrains: Labor, minimum water flow in 
the river, and the environmental flow to be released for the Fish River.
  We will assume a total 
amount of available labor in the watershed and a total amount of environmental flow to be 
released to the Fish River.  The total available labor to each player will be based on the relative 
                                                 
15 We should stress that the formulation of our CGT problem allows considering longer time horizons by creating for each player and coalitions 
optimization problems that span over T years but what the player considers is the expected annualized value.   16
total available land of that player (indicating the potential employment ability of that player).  
The allocation of the environmental flow amount will be made based on the basis of the total 
amount of water used by that player.  The minimum flow in the Kat river will be simply 
deducted from the available amount of water for each player. 
In the next step we move to the calculation of the characteristic functions of the partial 
coalitions.  We assume that all permutations are possible, even that between player 1 (U) and 
player 3 (L).  However, for these players we shall simply assume that what they can achieve in 
cooperating with each other is just the sum of what they can get separately. The difference 
between the calculation of the value of the other partial coalitions and the individual coalitions 
will be that the decision on water allocation and the total amounts of the minimum flow and the 
environmental flow can be made jointly rather than individually.  Additionally, the allocation of 
the rule values for labor, minimum flow and environmental flow will follow the pattern 
suggested in the case of the individual coalition calculations.   
And finally we move to calculate the characteristic function of the grand coalition.  In 
this case the labor constraint is at the watershed level, the minimum flow constraint is also at the 
watershed level, and the environmental flow constraint can be met at the outlet of the Kat when it 
leaves the area of Player 3 (L).   
  Let us now introduce the variables. 
i Fα  is the (natural) available flow (with probability greater or equal than α ) in watershed i . 
i S  is the stream entering part i (0 U S = ).  
i E  is ecological reserve constraint for part i  (flow leaving part i ). Since the ecological reserve 
level that is of interest is the quantity that leaves the watershed, each watershed i  is expected to 
release to the next one, and L is expected to release to the environment that same quantity, it will 
be denoted by E.  This is another simplifying assumption, as the level of E in each watershed i  
could quite be a decision variable. 
i C : water for civil use in part i . 
W(D) is the additional water available from the dam.   17
  A player, or a coalition, will use its available water, to maximize its revenue.  Actually, we 
assume that each player solves an optimization problem to maximize the use of the available 
water via allocation among all possible water uses.  The plan that maximizes the returns, is called 
the characteristic function of the coalition/player.  A very general exposition of the optimization 
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  Such an optimization problem is solved to yield solutions to the following coalitions 
(individuals, partial, and grand coalition) {U}, {M}, {L}, {U, M}, {M, L}, and {U, M, L}.  The 
solution for each coalition, the characteristic functions are denoted by: v({U}), v({M}), v({L}), 
v({U, M}), v({M, L}), and v({U, M, L}).  Note that according to our simplifying assumption 
v({U, L}) will be replaced by  v({U})+v({L}). 
  Using various game theory solution concepts, allocations of payoffs are made among the 
three players.  We use for demonstration the Shapley Value solution concept (Shapley, 1971): 
1
11
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where c(s) is the number of coalitions of size s containing player i : 
                                                 
16 A multi-year problem will be developed in our future work.   18




















s c  
Another CGT solution concept that is used in the paper is the nucleolus (we don’t provide the 
definition of the nucleolus: the interested reader can find it in standard references, as Owen, 
1995). Remember that this allocation always lies in the core, provided that it is non empty. In our 
results, the values of the nucleolus differ very little from those of the Shapley value. 
5.1 CGT results 
Based on simplified calculations (Annex), the following are the characteristic values of the Kat 




v({U, M})= 2,341,140 
v({U, L})=  1,521,753 
v({M, L})= 2,944,639 
v({U, M, L})=3,552,913 
  The resulting Shapley allocation is:  
= U φ  467,820.33 
= M φ 1,890,706.33 
= L φ  1,194,386.33 
with 
}) , , ({ L M U v L M U = + + φ φ φ , since the Shapley value provides an efficient allocation, 
L M U i i v i , , }), ({ = ≥ φ , which suggest individual rationality, and 
}) , ({ M U v M U ≥ +φ φ ,  }) , ({ L U v L U ≥ +φ φ , and  }) , ({ L M v L M ≥ +φ φ   which suggests group 
rationality (otherwise stated, the Shapley value lies in the core). 
  The payoff is distributed among the three players such that U, M, and L get 13, 53 and 34 
percent of the total cooperative profits, respectively.  U is clearly the main beneficiary from the 
CGT allocation, increasing its share in the cooperative payoff by 39 percent compared with the   19
non cooperation payoff, while both M and L gained 7 and 1 percent, respectively.  The CGT 
assumes utility transfer in the form of payments (or compensations). 
  For the nucleolus, the allocation is: 465,647 for U,  1,888,533 for M,  1,198,733 for L. 
Since the core is non empty (the Shapley value, as seen, lies in it), the nucleolus is also in the 
core.  Clearly, the fact of having a non-empty core, and of having found a couple of (close) 
allocations belonging to the core can be seen as “good news”, proving that there exist incentives 
for the players to cooperate. Since the allocation provided by the nucleolus are so close to those 
for the Shapley value (the differences are by far smaller than variations due to the 
approximations used or to the assumptions done), the same comments as for the Shapley value 
apply. Let’s stress that the nucleolus and the Shapley value incorporate different views about 
fairness. So, the fact that they are quite close each other means that the answers provided by 
these two views practically coincide, in this case, providing strong reasons in favor of such 
allocation(s). 
 
6. Comparison of negotiation and cooperative game theory allocations 
Any comparison between the NA/RPG and CGT outcomes has to be subject to several caveats.  
This is especially true at this early stage of our work.  First, the RPG has a dynamic nature that 
we cannot capture with the CGT model as simple as it is now.  Second, the main differences in 
the calculations of the profits of the players lead to possible discrepancies between the individual 
profits.  While the calculation of profits to the U, M, and L players in the case of the CGT are a 
result of an optimization process that takes into account very strict set of variables, the RPG 
process incorporates ‘real’ players that take into consideration many more factors than the 
algorithm used in the CGT.  Just these two caveats may explain possible differences in 
catchment outcomes.  As for the behavior of individual players, observations from the RPG 
session show that both irrigators and village managers aim at improving their respective 
indicators of performance (profit for irrigators; profit+residents’ satisfaction for village 
managers) without necessarily maximizing them. This might be due to a lack of information on 
the possible alternative strategies they could adopt during the RPG session and refers to a 
behavior called “satisficing”, where satisficing is an alternative to optimization for cases where 
there are multiple and competitive objectives in which one gives up the idea of obtaining a "best" 
solution (Simon, 1992). Players therefore adopt year after year strategies of incremental   20
improvement of their indicators. These strategies take into account external factors and must be 
discussed within (and cleared by) the WUA before they can be put in practice. In addition, 
willingness to reach an improved state does not correspond necessarily to an improved state of 
the players all along the RPG session: lack of play skills or external factors’ dynamics worst than 
forecasted can be the causes of performances less positive than expected. 
  As can be seen from a first comparison, the catchment profit (outcome), based on the RPG 
outcomes is 1.699 million Rand on average for the 6 years (varies between a low of 0.928 in year 
3 to a high of 3.075 million Rands in year 1.  We should mention that year 6 was a loss due to a 
decision by the WUA not to release water from the dam). The calculated profit was 3.552 million 
Rand using the first year’s water availability values in the CGT application.
17  
  While the total payoff at the catchment level may be different in the RPG and CGT 
procedures, due to use of different assumptions, we would have a more useful insight into the 
distribution of the payoff among the players.  In our case, the three sub-catchments U, M, and L 
shares in the catchment total profit was 9, 44 and 47 percent respectively in the RPG average 
year solution (Or 5, 55, 40 percent in the first year), and 13, 53 and 34 percent respectively in the 
CGT solution. 
7. Conclusions and extensions 
This paper developed a framework for comparison of CGT and RPG outcomes to a problem of 
water allocation among competing uses.  Such a framework is useful for several reasons.  First it 
allows the analysts to assess the nature of the assumptions made during the calculations or 
negotiation session.  Second it creates feedback loops between the CGT and the RPG to consider 
in further development of the tools. And third, it may suggest complementary roles for each 
approach under different conditions that the parties in the allocation problem face. 
  Acknowledging the overly simplified optimizations procedure in the case of the CGT, it is 
suggested that the baseline scenario in CGT will be modified in order to address new constraints 
and scenarios that have been considered in the RPG session.  This will include the dynamic 
nature of the allocation problem, and various structures to consider the environmental flow needs.  
Future sessions of the RPG will take CGT results into consideration, such as allowing for 
                                                 
17 Consider the 1
st year of RPG (Table 4), results are very close to CGT. The main difference is that during the game, investments for citrus are 
made in the RPG leading to no production for the young trees and changes in market prices reduce the profit, whereas these aspects have not been 
introduced in the CGT.)     21
negotiation among sub-catchments, and integrating the WUA to be part of the sub-catchments to 
eliminate independent decisions such as the one to stop release of water from the dam. 
  Additional extensions to be considered in future developments include: 
1.Developing a multi-year optimization model for each possible coalition in the catchment; 
2.Inclusion of additional CGT solution concepts and a stability index; 
3.Having the environmental flows level an endogenous part the optimization planning model; 
4.Having the village water supply and the urban residents utility a decision variable rather 
than a constraint; and  
5.Incorporating the stochastic nature of the rainfall and the water in the dam at the beginning 
of the period. 
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Annex: The formulation of the characteristic function 
The physical model 
Denote by 
0 D  the water stock behind the dam at the beginning of the planning period.   i R  
( 3 , 2 , 1 = i ) is the amount of rainfall on the area of player i.  We interpret that variable also to be 
the amount of water available for use by player i, and also the amount of water in the river that 
player i can use.  i D  is the request for flashes of water from the dam operator by player i.  
D R1  is 
the amount of water stored behind the dam during the planning period.  As noticed, only rainfall 
in the part of the area of player 1 can be dammed.  D  will be the amount of water behind the 
dam that can be used during the planning period. 
  Several relationship hold so far: 
[1]  1 1 R R
D ≤  
[2]  ∑ ≥ + =
i
i
D D R D D 1
0  
  We further denote by  i W the total demand for water, during the planning period, by 
player i and by E  the demand (allocation) for environmental needs where the watershed ends 
and the Kat River becomes a tributary of the Fish River.  This occurs after player UL’s area. 
  Here we add several more relationships: 
[3]  i i S W ≤ ,  
Where,  i S  is the supply of water available to player i as follows: 
[4] 
D R R D S 1 1 1 1 − + =  
[5]  ) ( 1 1 2 2 2 W S R D S − + + =  
[6]  ) ( 2 2 3 3 3 W S R D S − + + = , and finally 
  We need now to include more specific relationship representing the total water demand 
by each player.  Given the water use patterns by each player, there are agricultural uses (Citrus 
and Cabbage), and domestic uses (in the villages and urban centers).  This amount is imposed on 
the watershed and is subject to a policy decision.   25
  For our purposes, let 
v
i V , 
u
i V , 
C
i C , and 
B
i C  be the amounts of water used by the village, 









i i C C V V W + + + =  . 
Additional constraints: 
The WUA imposes minimum flow ( i MF ) to keep the river flowing in each subwatershed.  This 
minimum flow amount is deducted from each player’s amount of available water  i S . 
[8]  i i
MF
i MF S S − =  
In addition, the WUA imposes the environmental flow constraint.  We will handle that constraint 
in the following way: 
A total of EF  has to leave the Kat to the Fish river. This amount has to fulfill the following 
relationship: 
[9]  ∑ ≤
i
i EF EF  
The optimization process in each sub watershed 
The villages 
Villages. Assume that each village has a given population 
v
i N , that the annual water 
consumption per person is 
v
i v , the cost of providing each unit of water is 
v
i v P , and that the utility 
per inhabitant in the village from being provided a unit of water is 
v
i v u .  We assume that the 
utility is linear in money.  For simplicity assume that the ratio is 1:1.  The total ‘benefits’ from 
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i v N V ⋅ = . 
  We introduce a constraint on the minimal amount per year that a village inhabitant should 
be receiving per year. 
[10]  v v
v
i ≥ .   26
The citrus industry: 
Assume that citrus is grown with three factors of production, namely land, water and labor.  
Since we deal with a perennial crop and we assume no investment in new plantation, we will 
have the area of citrus in each sub-watershed fixed at 
C
i L .  Since in our model the area is fixed, 
the decision growers make is how much water per hectare to apply, including also no irrigation 
that end up with a minimum yield (Farolfi and Bonte, 2006). 
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i C Y  is the citrus production function.  It has a positive intercept at 
C
i C =0; 
C P  is the price 
per unit of citrus produced, which is a function of the amount of water applied per hectare, 
C
i C ; 
C
i C
i P  is the cost of water charged to the citrus operation in subwatershed i.  Note that we allow 
different water charges per crop and subwatershed; 
C
i B  is the labor per hectare of citrus; and 
B P  
is the cost per unit of labor, assuming the same for the entire Kat.   
The cabbage industry 
The cabbage industry production is very similar to that of the citrus except that, under our set of 
assumptions, the land for growing cabbage is not fixed (however, for realism we impose a 
constraint of 60 ha on the extension of land that can be used for cabbage; this constraint turns out 
to be binding only for player U and for the subcoalition {U,M}).  In the case of cabbage, the 
growers do not vary the amount of water per hectare, but decide only the area to be cultivated 













i P B P C P C L F
B
i ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = , where 
B P  is the cost per unit of cabbage produced (cost of labor has the same symbol; 
B
i C  is the 
amount of water applied per hectare of cabbage; 
B
i C
i P  is the cost of water charged to the cabbage 
operation in subwatershed i; 
B
i B  is the labor per hectare of cabbage.  Cabbage growers decide on 
the area they plant with cabbage 
B
i L .   27
The objective function of watershed i: 
Watershed i maximizes payoff from the three activities, subject to physical and institutional 
constraints: 





ii ii UUF F +++ , i=1, 2, 3 
        . .t s the relevant constraints in [1]-[10] 
The characteristic functions 
The characteristic function of the individual coalitions are actually a solution to an LP problems 
that are based on the coalition at stake.  In the case of the individual coalitions we solve [11] 
subject to relevant constraints in [1]-[10], and imposed rules of allocation of water from the Dam, 
Allocation of the minimum flow and allocation of the environmental flow among players 1, 2, 3. 
  Then we have the possibility of subcoalitions.  Clearly a coalition of {1, 2} and a 
coalition of {2, 3} can be envisioned.  As said, a coalition of {1, 3} is less obvious.  We can 
include such coalition on the premise that the WUA enforces rules and water transfers that are 
respected by its members. 